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With reference to your requests for information regarding messages which have been despatched by General Sosnkowski to Poland, I attach a short paper on this subject, setting out the facts as they are known to us at present. You will note the extreme paucity of direct evidence. This, however, does not mean that General Sosnkowski has not passed messages to Poland, but that we have not been able to procure them.

I would draw your special attention to the reports concerning lack of guidance given to the Underground Army, i.e. there have been sins of omission as well as commission. At this most difficult period in the Underground Army's existence, to remain without definite directives from General Sosnkowski places responsibility on local commanders which should not be carried by them.

Yours

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Lieut.-Colonel.

During the period General SIKORSKI was Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, General SOSNKOWSKI was responsible for the Underground movement inside POLAND. After the split between SIKORSKI and SOSNKOWSKI on the question of the Russian Pact and SOSNKOWSKI's withdrawal from participation in Polish affairs his Officers, and the Group supporting him, continued their influence on Polish underground matters. During this period, Capt. KALENKIEWICZ was despatched to POLAND with literally fantastic orders for the preparation of the country for aerial invasion. At the time when this Officer was held at an S.O.E. Holding Station, pending despatch to POLAND, every endeavour was made by S.O.E. officers to prove to him the impossibility of the orders which he had been instructed to deliver.

When General SOSNKOWSKI replaced General SIKORSKI as Polish Commander-in-Chief, further Officers were despatched to POLAND carrying the same instructions. It is pointed out that these instructions had no backing whatsoever from the Chiefs of Staff or from S.O.E. and that SOSNKOWSKI did not approach either of these bodies in order to obtain their views. During discussions at the VI Bureau, officers under SOSNKOWSKI's command, and standing close to him, constantly expressed the necessity for the landing of the Polish Air Force in POLAND and its maintenance by air in the event of a general rising. S.O.E. representatives at such meetings informed the Poles that such an operation was impossible. Nevertheless, under SOSNKOWSKI's command Polish Air Force officers were despatched to their country in considerable numbers, in order that the necessary preparations should be made for the arrival of the Polish Air Force. In other words, there is circumstantial evidence that SOSNKOWSKI had lead the Underground Army to assume that in the event of

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a General Rising they would receive not only Allied
air support far in excess of what had ever been promised
them by the Chiefs of Staff but also that the Polish
Air Force itself, together with the Polish Parachute
Brigade would land in POLAND for their assistance.

During the censorship period a telegram was despatched to POLAND as follows :-

" As far as strength permits we plan here the taking possession of the sea shore from Stettin to Koenigsberg inclusively by the Navy with the help of the Army.

Also matters connected with ports and trade will temporarily be under the supervision of the Navy.

For the taking of and the guarding of the sea shore and objectives on it, it will be necessary also to have after the cessation of occupying operations to employ considerable armed forces, which would remain on the shore as its garrison.

It appears desirable to make allowances for this in the calculations.

This telegram was despatched to POLAND long after the SOVIET had made it perfectly clear that the position at KOENIGSBERG was of considerable interest to them.

One of the best Officers working in collaboration with S.O.E. on Polish matters was Major JAZWINSKI who has recently resigned owing to differences of opinion with General SOSNKOWSKI on policy. On his resignation he informed us that the cause of his difference with London was with regard to the amount of help which would be given to POLAND in the event of a General Rising. He stated that, knowing the limitation of aircraft from ITALY, he was always unwilling to encourage false hopes. When he warned the Poles of this he was ordered by London not to communicate direct. He put his views to London but they were ignored and telegrams encouraging the General Rising continued to be sent. Major JAZWINSKI stated that he was unwilling to be implicated in useless bloodshed.

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Recently, in conversations with various Polish officers connected with Underground work in POLAND, they have complained of the lack of a directive from General SOSNKOWSKI to the G.O.C. and local Commanders in POLAND giving them guidance regarding their attitude in the event of a Russian advance. You will remember the only telegram of which we have knowledge was the one in which the local Commanders were ordered to declare themselves to the advancing Soviet Armies and state that they were the members of the Home Armies under the control of the Polish Government in London. The officers to whom we have spoken consider the spate of telegrams which have been received from all parts of POLAND containing complaints and accusations against the Russians regarding their treatment of Underground Army units might have been avoided if the local leaders had been kept fully informed and given definite orders by General SOSNKOWSKI.